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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the linkage between the per-
ceived intergenerational mobility and the preferences for tax payment.
Unfortunately, we do not have a unique dataset, however missing data
might be predicted by employing diﬀerent methods. We compare the ef-
ﬁciency of k-nearest-neighbors (kNN), Random Forest (RF) and Tobit-
2-sample-2-Stage (T2S2S) techniques in predicting the perceived inter-
generational mobility, hence we exploit the predicted values to estimate
the relation with tax morale. Results provide evidence of a strong neg-
ative relation between perceived mobility and tax cheating, suggesting
that fairness in tax payment has also to be seen on the light of the
perceived eﬃciency of the welfare state in providing more opportunities
across generations.
1 Introduction
High government spending is strictly dependent to an higher level of ﬁscal
capacity. Equivalently, a high level of taxation is not always well-seen by
tax-payers who observe a reduction of their budget constraint. These aspects
justify the existence of a trade-oﬀ between sustainability and willingness to
pay taxes as illustrated in the standard model of tax evasion (Allingham and
Sandmo, 1972), where risk-adverse taxpayers maximize the expected utility of
income on the basis of the probability to be detected and the total amount
of the ﬁne due. The idea that cheating on taxes depends not only on mone-
tary but also on psychological factors took hold in 1990. Luttmer and Singhal
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(2014) deﬁned tax morale as the totality of non-pecuniary motivations low-
ering people propensity to pay taxes. That is, investigating the interaction
eﬀects between formal and informal institutions in shaping the tax morale
might lead to new important insights, for instance inequality might trigger tax
cheating. As discussed by Alesina and Rodrik (1994), in a society where there
are unequal access to resources, there will be an high demand for redistribu-
tion and this conﬂict obstacles the economic growth. Conversely, Senik (2009)
noticed that attitudes towards inequality depend on an individual's calculation
of his or her own chances and possible direction of mobility. To wit, whether
on one hand mobility might be enhanced by the state, the perception of a
quite immobile society might disencourage tax payment, since poorer expect
to suﬀer from greater inequality in the future and they found ineﬀective the
redistribution role of tax levy. Unluckily, we have to merge information from
two diﬀerent datasets (The European Values Survey (EVS) 2008 and the In-
ternational Social Survey Programme 2009 (ISSP)) to estimate the eﬀect on
tax cheating. Literature proposed several methods to treat missing data (see
Efron and Hastie (2010)) and in the methodology we propose, we compare k-
nearest-neighbors(kNN), Random Forest and Tobit-2-sample-2-Stage (T2S2S)
accuracy in the estimation of the perceived social mobility (INT ). The variable
under consideration is an existing data of the ISSP survey (If you compare
this job to the job your father had when you were <14,15,16>, would you say
that the level of status of your job is (or was)?) that is missing in the EVS
one. Data have been merged on the basis of a common set of information
given.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst present a Litera-
ture Review (section 2) we discuss the accuracy of the methodology proposed
(section 3). Then, we report our results in section 4. Finally, section 5 con-
cludes.
2 Literature Review
The relationship between perceived intergenerational mobility and the prefer-
ences for tax payment is strictly related, at least, with two stands of literature
: the one which analyze social and individual responsibility toward tax pay-
ment and the other which focus on the driving factor of the intergenerational
mobility. The standard model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) has been
considered as the reference point to explain cheating on taxes, stating that a
proﬁt-maximization agents maximized their own monetary pay-oﬀs according
to the expected probability to be ﬁned. However it has not been able in itself
to explain the whole attitude toward tax evasion, which is why the concept of
tax morality has become increasingly importance in deﬁning the intrinsic moti-
vation to pay taxes (Torgler, 2002b, 2005c, 2012; Torgler and Schneider, 2007).
Generally, trustness in public authorities, particularly in the fairness and in
the eﬀectiveness of the public expenditure potentially improve tax compliance
(Torgler and Schneider (2004), Torgler et al. (2007, 2008, 2010), Barone and
Mocetti (2011),Trüdinger and Hildebrandt (2013), Vythelingum et al. (2017)).
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Moreover, inequality and GDP performance inﬂuence citizens attitude toward
taxes (Williams and Krasniqi (2017), Williams and Martinez (2014), Doerren-
berg and Peichl (2010)), since the higher is perceived the meritocracy and the
perception of the social and the economic progress, the higher seems to be
human responsibility toward duties, such as tax payment. A recent study of
Amendola et al. (2018) pointed out the negative relation between inequality
and happiness. To sum up, we can state that satisfaction lays down the basis
to the willingness to comply and tax evasion is not merely a question of money,
inasmuch a prominent role is played by the interaction eﬀects between formal
and informal institutions (Horodnic, 2018).
Although income inequality might be seen as a signal of intra-generational
mobility, the perceived chances to ameliorate social and labor position in the
future might be also used as an index of satisfaction and inter-generational
mobility. Piketty (2000) revised the key factors that determine the trans-
mission and the persistence of inequality across generations. Mulligan (1997)
focused on the perpetuated inequalities in earning, while Becker and Tomes
(1986) pointed out the theory of the eﬃcient ability transmission, where each
subjects is able to invest in education since it returns proﬁtability regardless
of the social status. Franzini and Pianta (2015) identiﬁed four "engines of
inequality": 1) the power of capital over labor which reduce wages; 2) the rise
of oligarchs capitalism, where a limited number of people concentrate a large
and increasing share of income and wealth; 3) the individualisation of social
and economic conditions,where the identiﬁcation into a social status create
discrimination,diﬀerent level of wages and the fragmentation of the population
slow down the growth; 4)the retreat of politics and its controversial role in the
redistribution of wealth. Moreover, Benabou (1993) involved the diﬀerences
in counties to explain the ampliﬁcation of the future human capital disparity
and self-fulﬁlling beliefs refers to racial or social discrimination or simply to
diﬀerent cultural attitude. With regard to the preference for redistribution,
Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso (2016) evidenced that pessimism about social
mobility are correlated with policy preferences and tends to favor more gener-
ous redistributive policies, especially about the equality of opportunity.
The aforementioned considerations strengthen our research hypothesis: does a
lower perception of intergenerational mobility discourage tax morale? In the
next section we provide an extensive analysis of our approach.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Some Theoretical Notes
As announced, we do not have a unique dataset therefore we have to exploit in-
formation available to relate the dependent variable of our model (tax morale)
and the independent one ( perceived intergenerational mobility). The problem
might be summarized as follow:
• the ISSP dataset contains information on the perceived intergenerational
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mobility (INT ) but unfortunately lacks of the respondent preferences
toward Tax Cheating(TC );
• the EVS dataset displays the opposite case;
• Both of the datasets share common information (X) about respondents'
characteristics and preferences.
The basic idea is that we can predict the relation between Intergenerational
Mobility INT and X, then impute the variable where it is missing by exploiting
the same variable. Let us consider
INT T = {INTISSP , INTEV S}
as the perceived intergenerational mobility, where INTEV S is missing and
XT = {XISSP , XEV S}
as the common information matrix about respondents' characteristics and pref-
erences.
Now we can exploit the relation between:
P (INTISSP ) ∼ P (INTISSP |XISSP )
to obtain
P (INTEV S) ∼ P (INTEV S|XEV S, XISSP , INTISSP )
that is, the estimation methods seems to do not be in function of the tax
morale, enhancing the validity of the subsequent estimation (henceforth ﬁnal
model):
P (TCEV S|INTEV S, ZEV S)
Where Z are some other control variables.
On the other hand, we can not ensure that the instrumental variable choose
are independent from the response variable (TM), hence endogeneity problem
might arise. As demonstrated in Jerrim, Choi and Simancas (2017), the most
powerful will be the prediction, the lower will be the endogeneity bias, we have
to be worried about the inﬂuence that the estimator has on the dependent
variable of the ﬁnal model. Formally :
P (ÎNT ) ∼ P (INT |X) ⊥ P (TC)
if and only if
P (TC) ∼ P (TC|X) ∼ P (TC)P (X)
That it can be deﬁned as the exogeneity condition. In our case:
P (ÎNT ) ∼ P (INT |X)
P (TC|ÎNT ) ∼ P (TC|INT ) ∼ P (TC|INT + ÎNT − ÎNT )
P (TC|ÎNT ) ∼ P (TC|INT ) + P (TC|ÎNT − INT )
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Where P (TC|ÎNT − INT ) can be seen as the bias of our model. Hence,
what we expect to observe is E(TC|ÎNT − INT ) = 0 to ﬁt the consistency of
the model. Basically, it happens whether:
• The estimated data are closer the observed ones (( ÎNT − INT ) ap-
proaches to zero);
• The distribution is randomly distributed as the error term.
In short, we ﬁrst ﬁt the best method to classify data by taking all the variables
1 and after remove the eﬀect of the potential endogenous ones.
Generally, there are diﬀerent estimation techniques of missing values (for a
complete overview see Efron and Hastie (2017) or Hastie, Tibshirani and Fried-
man (2017)). We check whether:
Proposition 1 Imputing data by classiﬁcation of observations (for instance by
using a machine learning techniques) outperforms classical methods of imputa-
tion based on a general shaping of the functional form of variable relationships.
Proposition 2 After having found the technique that best ﬁts our purpose,
we aim to identify some relation between the perceived earnings mobility and
tax compliance. In the simplest vision of the proof, we wish to conﬁrm that
meritocracy inﬂuences subjects willingess to contribute to the sustainability of
the welfare state;
We employ three diﬀerent approaches to impute data: 1) Tobit-Two-Sample-
Two-Stage (T2S2S), 2) k-Nearest-Neighbors (kNN) and 3) Random forest
(RF). The ﬁrst type of estimation belongs to the class of model based (super-
vised), methods where the relation between response variables and regression
is a priori predetermined, while the last two approaches are based upon the
most recent machine learning techniques, that is, no relation is deﬁned a pri-
ori, maybe the imputation of the data is made by considering some metrics of
similarity between data, hence the shape of the distribution is calculated by
inferring on them.
3.1.1 Tobit-Two-Sample-Two-Stage (T2S2S)
Given a censored response variable (in our case tax morale lies between 1 and
10) we might exploit a regression model for prediction. Let XT be a vector
of characteristics XT= {X1, X2, ..., Xp}, we ﬁrst predict βˆT={βˆ0, βˆ1, ..., βˆp} by
exploiting:
INTISSP = βˆ0 +
p∑
j
XISSP jβˆj
and after
INTEV S = βˆ0 +
p∑
j
XEV Sjβˆj
1Roughly speaking, we states that, for instance, if it might be considered true that a
part-time elder employed respondent with and low level of income comes from a family with
a full-employed father perceive its labor position lower than the one of his parent, it makes
some sense to extend this perception to subjects sharing the same characteristics.
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might be predicted by using the same coeﬃcient. As discussed above, one limit
of such approach is that we are conjecturing the global shape of the relation.
3.1.2 k-Nearest-Neighbors (kNN)
Nearest-neighbor methods use those observations in the ISSP dataset closest
in input space to X to form INTISSP . Hence, to ﬁt the predicted INTEV S
we have to consider the same cluster of characteristics linked to INTISSP and
then impute ̂INTEV S
̂INTEV S =
1
k
∑
xi∈Nk(x)
INTISSP i
where Nk(x) is the neighborhood of x deﬁned by the k closest points xi in
the sample. Closeness implies a metric, which we assume to be the Euclidean
distance.
3.1.3 Random forest (RF)
Since the response variable is continuous, we employ an unsupervised regres-
sion threes model. We adapt the description of the algorithm of Hastie, Tib-
shirani and Friedman (2017). Random forest is based on the bagging, that
is, it both bootstrap from the original sample and aggregate the estimation
obtained. In detail:
1. Bootstrapped samples (from b=1 to B) are drawn from the original one:
2. A random forest Tb is grown for each subsample, by creating nodes
through the m out of p variables selected at random;
3. to predict ̂INTEV S we have:
̂INTEV S = fˆBrf (X) =
1
B
B∑
b=1
Tb(X)
Even in this case, the advantage is that the functional form of the regression
is locally determined through nonlinear estimators (trees).
3.2 Data Description
The EVS Longitudinal Data Files 1981-2008 include data and documentation
of 48 countries/regions that participated in the four EVS waves. In our case, we
restrict the analysis to the Italian survey of EVS 2008, using 1519 observations.
On the other side, The International Social Survey Programme 2009 (ISSP)
focused on social inequality perception surveyed 1084 italian respondents. In
order to do not lose observation, we impute missing data in the two datasets ,
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coming ahead with a ﬁnal dataset of 2603 independent observation. The XT
matrix is formed by2:
XT ={X1, X2, ..., Xp}
XT ={edu, age, occ, edu, hhmembers, region, religion, , laborunion,
, sexdiscr, occr, occf , income, inequality, unemp-perc, hardwork,
election}
where:
• Age is a numeric variable reporting the respondent's age ;
• sex is a categorical variable reporting the respondent's age ;
• education is a categorical variable reporting the respondent's educational
level ;
• hh members is a continuous variable reporting the household members ;
• region is a categorical variable reporting the twenty italian regions;
• religion is a categorical variable controlling for the religiosity of the re-
spondent ;
• labor union is a dummy that accounts for respondent's belonging to union
membership ;
• sexdiscr is a dummy that considers the disparities perception to be born
woman or man;
• occr is a categorical variable reporting the occupational status;
• occf is a categorical variable reporting the previous occupational status
of father respondent;
• election is a categorical variable reporting the wing of the parties voted
at the latest election;
• income is a continuous variable reporting the wing of the monthly family
income;
• hardwork is a continuous variable reporting the importance of hard work
in daily life;
• unemp−perc is a continuous variable reporting the importance of helping
unemployed people;
• inequality is a continuous variable reporting the perception of income
inequality in the Country;
The perceived intergenerational mobility (INT ) is calculated by using a
the following question from the ISSP survey: If you compare this job to the
job your father had when you were <14,15,16>, would you say that the level
of status of your job is (or was)? and moves from 1 (lower mobility) to 5
(higher mobility). In the ﬁnal model, we relate tax morale and the estimated
perceived intergenerational mobility by controlling for:
• the economic position of the respondent according to its level of income;
• post-materialism attitude of the society;
• trustworthiness in the development of democracy;
• macro-area eﬀects (north,center and south)
Now we can move on evaluating the accuracy of the estimation.
2In the appendix (Table 3A) might be found the correspondent questions and the de-
scription of the variable .
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4 Analysis and Results
For the sake of soundness, ﬁrstly we discuss the accuracy of the model by
applying a train/test split of the ISSP sample, where the INT variable is
already known. Basically, we aim to consider the validity of our results in a
twofold ways: ﬁrstly by controlling the normalized root mean squared error
(NRMSE) and the correlation between the observed value and the ﬁtted one in
the test data and after by checking the robustness of the results with respect
to the size of the training dataset. Intuitively, we are going to consider the
variable at issue as known in the training data and as a missing value in the
test one, even if we known the real observed values, hence they can be used
post-hoc to evaluate the forecasting. Since the ISSP dataset covers only the 41
% of the complete dataset, this might be seen as a real menace to the validity
of the model, this is why we test whether somethings changes according to the
dimension of the training test.
Figure 1: Correlation plot. The dashed lines divided the graph area into three
diﬀerent sections: left (training data 25%), center (training data 50%) and
right (training data 75%). Random Forest outperforms both kNN (T-value:
-43.942,p-value=0.00) and T2S2S (T-value: -45.589,p-value=0.00).
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Figure 2: NRMSE plot. The dashed lines divided the graph area into three dif-
ferent sections: left (training data 25%), center (training data 50%) and right
(training data 75%). Random Forest outperforms both kNN (T-value:80.262,p-
value=0.00) and T2S2S (T-value: 241.92, p-value=0.00)
Proposition 1 As displayed, Random Forest best ﬁts both in terms of cor-
relation and normalized root mean squared error3. Moreover, test accuracy
do not signiﬁcantly improved according to the growth of the training data.
Jointly considering the positivity of these aspects, we can advance with the
rest of the analysis.
Figure 3: Variance Importance Plot in the estimation of the perceived social
mobility
As expected, age,type of occupation and education, family members and
the level of income inﬂuence the attitude toward the inequality. Firstly, we
3The analysis has been conducted in R though missForest, RandomForest, kNN and AER
packages
9
report the correlation matrix to ﬁnd the continuous variable which potentially
aﬀect both tax cheating and have been used to classify the estimated perceived
intergenerational mobility. Hence we remove their eﬀect from the variable by
taking the residual terms.
As can be seen, the educational level, the perception of the inequality
and the attitude toward unemployment people are correlated. In general we
ﬁnd no higher correlation, maybe we can remove the average eﬀect of age (
-0.1780) and of the perceived inequality of income (-0.1301) making a pairwise
regression 4
hhmembers edu income ineq hard_work age family income INT TC
hhmembers 1.0000
education 0.1053 1.0000
income ineq -0.0332 -0.0649 1.0000
hard work -0.0168 -0.0261 0.0871 1.0000
age -0.4898 -0.4073 0.1346 0.0157 1.0000
family inc 0.1419 0.2962 -0.0906 0.0164 -0.1964 1.0000
INT -0.2936 -0.1702 0.0462 0.0188 0.5794 0.1686 1.0000
TC 0.0710 0.0187 -0.1301 0.0151 -0.1780 -0.0631 -0.1485 1.000
Table 1: correlation matrix
In fact, by running a ﬁrst tobit regression with the reduced form of the
model, we have that:
TC Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [ 95% Conf. Interval]
INT -2.821 .443 -6.36 0.000 -3.692 -1.951
cons 8.855 1.401 6.32 0.000 6.105 11.605
σ 4.425 0.151 4.129 4.722
Table 2:Log likelihood = -2244.3681, LR chi2(1) =41.15, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
The estimate seems to be upward biased, in particular we noted that the
error correlation Cov(ÎNT , u)=−0.1246∗, conﬁrming the endogeneity already
stated from the previous correlation matrix. We pairwise each other the re-
gressors in order to delete dependency and get them uncorrelated. Since Age
is related with the other variable, we pairwise regressed them on this regres-
sor. At the end of the procedure, we succeded in eliminating the correlation
between variables. As ﬁnal step, we look forward to remove their inﬂuence and
the one of the categorical variables inserted in the ﬁnal model (Geographical
Area, Democracy Perception, Post Materialism Index and occupational status)
from the perceived intergenerational mobility (INT ).
4the variable are jointly correlated, which is why we ﬁrstly remove the eﬀect they have
on each other
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îneq ̂education ÎNT age TC ̂familyincome ̂hhmembers hard work
îneq 1.0000
̂education 0.0000 1.0000
ÎNT 0.0000 -0.0000 1.0000
age -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 1.0000
TC -0.1078 -0.0589 -0.0314 -0.1780 1.0000
̂familyincome -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0956 1.0000
̂hhmembers -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0133 -0.0000 1.0000
hard work 0.0855 -0.0216 0.0083 0.0157 0.0151 0.0316 -0.0191 1.0000
Table 3: Correlation Matrix with estimated residuals
Here again, we consider the reduced version of the model:
TC Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
ÎNT -2.069 0.728 -2.84 0.005 -3.497 -0.641
cons -0.151 0.164 -0.92 0.359 -0.474 0.172
σ 4.489 0.153 4.188 4.790
table 4. Reduced form. Log likelihood = -2263.0187 , Prob > chi2 = 0.0499
TC Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
INT -2.087 0.698 -2.99 0.003 -3.457 -.718
ineq perc -0.589 0.145 -4.04 0.000 -0.875 -0.303
education -0.255 0.160 -1.60 0.111 -0.569 0.058
age -0.045 0.0111 -4.09 0.000 -0.0672 -0.023
family income -0.302 0.087 -3.44 0.001 -0.475 -0.130
IT: North 0.156 0.373 0.42 0.675 -0.575 0.889
IT: South 0.554 0.381 1.46 0.146 -0.192 1.302
Mixed -.0266 0.339 -0.79 0.431 -0.932 0.398
Post-materialist -0.949 0.441 -2.15 0.032 -1.815 -0.082
Not very satisﬁed 0.933 0.368 2.53 0.011 0.210 1.656
Rather satisﬁed 0.947 0.403 2.35 0.019 0.155 1.739
Very satisﬁed 1.149 0.979 1.17 0.241 -0.771 3.069
home duties -0.807 0.495 -1.63 0.103 -1.78 0.164
other -1.306 1.640 -0.80 0.426 -4.524 1.911
part time 0.107 0.492 0.22 0.827 -0.859 1.074
retired -0.563 0.494 -1.14 0.254 -1.532 0.405
student -0.143 0.535 -0.27 0.789 -1.194 0.907
unemployed 0.275 0.535 0.51 0.607 -0.774 1.325
constant 1.517 0.728 2.08 0.037 0.088 2.945
σ 4.255 0.144 3.971 4.539
Table 5. Complete form. Log likelihood = -2201.6264 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Here the correlation Cov(ÎNT , u) = −0.0033 and it is not statistically
signiﬁcant at 5 % level.That is,jointly considering the correlation matrix and
the residuals correlation, no omitted variable problems seems to arise. Tobit
models suggest us that that tax cheating attitude increases:
• the lower is perceived the social mobility;
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• the higher is the claim to re-estabilish income inequality ;
• the lower is the family income;
• higher is the unsatisfaction toward the democracy progress;
Proposition 2 As motivated before, meritocracy is a hint of tax morale.
Particularly, we promote the idea that higher level of tax cheating are linked
to lower level of meritocracy perception, since perceived mobility might be a
valid proxy of the perception of welfare quality from a dynamic point of view.
4.1 Consideration on the Estimation Technique
The novelty of the approach we propose is based on the possibility of using
non-linear estimation techniques and several instrumental variables useful to
predict missing data. Moreover, since the common variables could brought out
endogenous problems, we use a pairwise regression taking the residuals, getting
ahead 1) simulating data by using all the common information, obtaining a
more precise estimate and 2) building up a consistent model. Such method
might be seen as a bridge-builder between classical econometric methodologies
and machine learning techniques, contributing to the developing idea that their
joint application might be a useful tool in uncovering generalizable patterns
(see Mullainathan and Spiess, 2017) and make the data analysis aﬀordable. In
our research, we ﬁnd crucial that the imputation of missing data might have
some sense regardless of the statistical signiﬁcance of the relation obtained.
To wit, in our case we estimate the perceived social mobility on the basis of a
not spurious relation: it is plausible that education, income level and relation
between fathers-sons type of occupation and inequality perception might be
a valid proxy to estimate the perceived mobility. On the contrary, exploiting
the same variable to estimate tax cheating might be quite unrealistic even if
the relation might get some statistical sense, since it is a view too personal to
be simulated.
5 Policy Implication and Conclusions
Aimed to contribute to the existing theory, we conclude that perceived labor
mobility negatively aﬀect the promotion of a welfare system. In our analysis
we have to recognize some limits due to the lack of data availability, however,
by means of a machine learning approach such as Random Forest, we have
been able to impute observation in the most eﬃcient way on the basis of
the data at hand. Until now, the state of art explains tax morale in terms
of intra-generational perception of unfairness and happiness, as discussed in
the Literature Review section. Conversely, there are few works attempting
to explain the direction of tax payment from a dynamic point of view, that
is, the basic idea is that cheating is not only given by the actual perceived
unfairness, but also it is still persistent on the light of the future perspective.
As proposed in the econometric model, the perception of an immobile society
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strongly discourage subject to contribute, since they can not positive evaluate
the eﬃciency of the welfare state. To conclude, attention should be focused
not only on the impact of the tax system as a whole, but it also should be
taken into account the expectations of individuals when taxes are paid. The
lower will be the return, the lower will be the willingness to pay. Agreeing
with recent works we might state that the propensity of paying taxes has to
be seen not only as a wealthy optimization problem, but it is also in function
of the perceived social status.
Appendix
In the ﬁrst part of the appendix we report an instrumental variable approach
to solve endogeneity. After having simulated data, we use edu variable as
instrument to estimate the perceived intergenerational mobility. Since it is
negatively correlated with the regressor but uncorrelated with the response
variable, we invert the order to turn the relation positive. That is, here a
positive variation of education has to be read as a reduction of years spent in
instruction. We solved correlation between variables as before and ruled out
occupation because the estimation algorithm does not converge in that case
and age and family income since they are correlated with the instrument.
age tax cheating int ̂familyincome ̂incomeineq êdu
age 1.0000
tax cheating -0.1780 1.0000
int 0.5794 -0.1485 1.0000
̂familyincome 0.0035 -0.0699 0.2523 1.0000
̂incomeineq 0.0000 -0.1071 -0.0321 -0.0776 1.0000
êdu 0.5250 -0.0170 0.1853 0.0018 -0.0015 1.0000
Table 1A. Correlation matrix
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
INT -4.726 2.678203 -1.76 0.078 -9.975966 .522398
Not very satisﬁed 0.847 0.383 2.21 0.027 0.096 1.598
Rather satisﬁed 0.966 0.442 2.18 0.029 0.098 1.833
Very satisﬁed 1.052 1.037 1.01 0.310 -0.981 3.086
Mixed -0.280 0.380 -0.74 0.461 -1.026 0.465
Post-materialist -1.017 0.500 -2.03 0.042 -1.998 -0.035
IT: Isole -22.208 4189.56 -0.01 0.996 -8233.595 8189.178
IT: Nord 0.482 0.507 0.95 0.341 -0.512 1.47
IT: Sud 1.060 0.453 2.34 0.019 0.172 1.948
̂incomeineq -0.626 0.150 -4.17 0.000 -0.920 -0.331
constant 13.933 8.388 1.66 0.097 -2.508 30.375
Instrumented INT
Instruments 2.demo 3.demo 4.demo 2.materialism 3.materialism 2.area
3.area 4.area ̂incomeineq ̂education
Table 2A. Wald test of exogeneity (α = 0): chi2(1) = 0.34 Prob > chi2 = 0.5623
Since endogeneity does not persist, the estimation seems to be upwardly
biased regarding to the size of the relation.
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In the table below it is reported a summary table of the common dataset
exploited to estimate the perceived social mobility.
Variable Questionnaire Transformed Variable
ISSP EVS
Age AGE X003 from 0 to 100
Sex SEX X001 Male, Female
family members HOMPOP from X002_02B to _06B from 0 to 100
Education IT_DEGR X025 from 0 to 5
Occupation WRKST X028 retired,full_time, part_time,home_duties,
students,other,unemployed
Marital Status MARITAL X007 married, single, separated,widow
Region IT_REG X048F factor levels from 1 to 20
Religion RELIG F025 catholic,islam, others
Union UNION A067 0,1
Income Equality V33 E033 1,2,3,4
Sexual Discrimination V16 C001 0,1,2
father occ V56 V005 employed,self-employed,unemployed
hard work V75 A005 0,1,2,3
Election IT_PRTY E179 left wing, right wing, other
Family income IT_INC X047A from 1 to 8
Perception of unemployment V34 E160 from 1 to 5
Tax Cheating NA F116 from 1 (never justiﬁed) to 10 (justiﬁed)
Perceived mobility V46 NA from 1 (worsening) to 5 (improvement)
Table 3A.Common Variables Description.
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